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Chinese Cross-listing and Dividend Policy: 




The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effects of overseas cross-listing on Chinese 
companies’ dividend policy and to present evidence on the prevalence of the bonding theory. We 
believe that by cross-listing, Chinese companies bond themselves to a well-developed capital 
market with a more stringent legislation environment and therefore facilitate the improvement of 
their corporate governance. We hypothesize that cross-listing has a positive effect on the corporate 
governance, which results in a higher propensity of dividend payments. We collect data on all 
dual-listed and multiple-listed Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, 
Singapore stock exchange, NYSE, or NASDAQ from 1993 to 2014. We use two samples to 
conduct the analyses: a full sample covering all cross-listed and non-cross-listed Chinese public 
firms, and a subsample containing all the cross-listed firms with their propensity score-matched 
non-cross-listed firms. The results for the full sample indicate more dividends per share, a higher 
dividend payout ratio, and a higher likelihood to pay cash dividends in cross-listed firms, while 
the results for the matched sample only suggests a higher dividend payout ratio in cross-listed 
firms compared to their counterparts. The results also reveal that Chinese cross-listed companies 
pay more dividends to overseas investors than domestic investors and the issuance of the Corporate 
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1. Introduction  
 
Cross-listing (sometimes referred to as “dual-listing” or “multi-listing”) is known as a common 
strategy in which a firm lists its equity both on home country stock exchanges and on one or several 
overseas stock exchanges (Karolyi, 2012). The trend of cross-border listing started in the 1970s 
when a large number of public companies from developed markets listed their shares in foreign 
markets, and according to Foerster and Karolyi (1993), these companies list equity overseas to 
increase their share base and reduce the cost of raising capital. Starting in 1980, the number of 
cross-border listings began increasing, and during the 1990s, many emerging economies started to 
allow foreigners to invest in their stock market. China also opened its door to join the global 
economy in the early 1990s. During that time, the economy was transferred from purely politic-
oriented to more economic-oriented, and two Chinese stock exchanges—the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges—were created. Nevertheless, massive government control still existed 
in the capital market and enterprises: the Chinese government issued a quota on public offerings. 
The restriction prohibited many companies from listing in their home market; as a result, these 
companies choose to cross list as an alternative way to raise capital.  
 
A traditional explanation for cross-listing is market segmentation theory, introduced by Stapleton 
and Subrahmanyam in 1977. Previous studies have found that barriers, such as regulatory 
restrictions and asymmetric information problems, exist across different economies and capital 
markets all over the world. By cross-listing, a company listing its stock in a foreign equity market 
could overcome these barriers and reduce the cost of capital (see Alexander et al. 1988; Foerster 
and Karolyi, 1993; Karolyi, 1998; Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977). Another theory, the 
bonding theory, is also supported by numerous researchers (e.g., Ayyagari and Doidge, 2010; 
Burns et al., 2007; Coffee 1999; Doidge, 2004; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Stulz, 1999). It 
suggests a company whose home country has weak legislation and poor shareholder protection 
would be likely to suffer from an agency problem. To mitigate this governance problem, the 
company could cross list its shares in one or more foreign countries with a better legal environment 
and stronger protection for shareholders. Moreover, bonding has been proved to have a positive 
influence on minority shareholders, as their rights will be increased and protected better. Coffee 
(1999) found that firms which pursue growth to a global scale would uphold themselves to higher 
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legal standards and well-developed governance systems, which could disperse controlling rights 
from controlling shareholders to public shareholders. La Porta et al. (1998) stated that a more 
stringent legislation would prevent controlling shareholders from expropriating minority 
shareholders and encourage minority shareholders to exercise their rights. Ayyagari and Doidge 
(2010) argued that issuers adopt a cross-listing in the U.S. to promote changes in ownership and 
control. Regarding dividend payment, Grossman and Hart (1980), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen 
(1986) found that the distribution of cash dividends cut the amount of cash owned by management, 
so it can prevent managers from making bad investments. Allen et al. (2000) and Allen and 
Michaely (2003) claimed that external control and monitoring are necessary to assure management 
made payout decisions according to the shareholders’ interests instead of their own interests. 
Therefore， we deducted that improvement in corporate governance and shareholder rights could 
made cross-listed companies increase their dividend. As for China, Sun et al. (2012) came up with 
a “modern enterprise” or “governance” theory that explicated the reason for Chinese cross-listing. 
They stated that one reason for the Chinese government to list SOEs in a better-regulated market 
is to benefit from a “governance premium”, learn from developed markets and establish modern 
enterprises domestically. The chief of the State Asset Commission has also emphasized that to 
build modern capital markets and modern enterprises, the government will continue selecting large 
SOEs to list abroad.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to test whether cross-listing increases companies’ propensity to pay 
dividends and further to test the prevalence of the bonding theory. The propensity of paying 
dividends includes the amount of dividend payments and the likelihood of dividend payments. We 
also believe that Chinese companies benefit from developed market systems and stringent 
regulations to facilitate the development of corporate governance. Correspondingly, they have a 
higher propensity to pay dividends due to enhanced protection towards minority stockholders. 
Thus, we propose four hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that after cross-listing overseas, Chinese 
cross-listed firms are more likely to pay dividends than non-cross-listed companies. Second, we 
hypothesize that Chinese cross-listed companies pay more dividends than non-cross-listed 
companies. Third, Chinese companies that are cross-listed overseas pay more dividends to 
overseas investors than domestic investors, as we believe that despite the government’s attempts 
to build a modern market and improve corporate governance, the protection for minority 
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shareholders is still weaker than in developed countries. Berkman et al. (2010) also stated that the 
Chinese legal system and market infrastructure still fall behind developed markets. Lastly, we 
expect that following the corporate governance reform, Chinese firms pay more dividends to their 
investors in the home country than before, as the corporate governance will be improved. 
 
To investigate the impact of cross-listing on dividend payment propensity, a traditional approach 
is to run regression with a dependent variable that denotes dividend payments and dummy 
variables that denote cross-listing. However, there are several problems with the observed sample. 
First, it is difficult to observe the counterpart of cross-listing, as one company cannot be cross-
listed and non-cross-listed at the same time. Therefore, a group of non-cross-listed companies were 
obtained to compare them with cross-listed companies. The second problem is selection bias, as 
cross-listed companies may have certain characteristics in common; for example, large, profitable 
and low-leverage companies are potential candidates for overseas listing (Sun et al., 2012 and Mei 
et al., 2009), so the estimation of the cross-listed sample is likely to be disturbed by those common 
characteristics. The third difficulty is the endogeneity problem: factors that both determine the 
cross-listing decision and the propensity to pay dividends. We use the propensity score matching 
(PSM) approach to find counterparts for the matched companies and to solve the problem caused 
by selection bias. An untreated company is selected to match a treated company according to the 
propensity scores, so we established a matched sample out of the whole sample. The matched 
sample consists of a control group (i.e., non-cross listed matches) and a treatment group (i.e., cross-
listed firms). Then, we estimated several multivariate regressions separately with the matched and 
whole samples to determine whether the cross-listed companies pay more dividends and pay 
dividends more often. If the bonding theory could appropriately explicate the motivation of cross-
listing, we expect improvements in corporate governance and stockholder protection and observe 
a relatively higher propensity in the cross-listed firms.  
 
This research proposes a new method on supporting bonding theory. Past studies were focusing 
on stock prices, control rights and company performances. However, we suggested that the 
propensity to pay cash dividends reflect the level of corporate governance and protection towards 
minority shareholders, so we use dividend payment dummy, dividend per share and dividend yield 
to check if the changes and difference shows that cross-listing has a positive influence on dividend 
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payment. We collected the dividend payment in all markets where the company is cross-listed as 
well as the exchange rate and market value to make the dividend payment comparable. 
Furthermore, we conducted tests and ran regressions to determine whether cross-listing increase 
dividend payouts. If the results show significant increase or positive difference, we interpret this 
as a result of legal bonding. Also, past research rarely shed light on the prevalence of bonding 
theory in Chinese companies, as in China the situation is different from developed markets: 
governance control exists in the stock market and many enterprises are enforced to cross-listed 
overseas, so the topic is worth studying. 
 
Furthermore, as we are also worried about other unobservable characteristics that may influence 
cross-listing and dividend payments at the same time, we used an interaction term to absorb the 
effects of unobservable situations. The approach is based on an exogenous event that is universal, 
mandatory and has an impact on cross-listing. The external event we made use of is the issuance 
of the Corporate Governance Code in 2002. This code was issued by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) with the aim to enhance corporate governance. The 
implementation of the code is universal and effective, and corporate governance have been 
significantly improved since then (Sun et al., 2012). We conducted multivariate regression for the 
robustness check, using an interaction term (product of a cross-list dummy and year dummy) as 
independent variables. Since the event is initiated by the government, we suppose that this 
interaction variable captures the casual influence on the propensity of dividend payment, and if the 
bonding theory is true, the issuance of the code will have a positive influence on firms’ propensity 
to pay dividends.  
 
The results are overall in support of our hypothesis: Chinese cross-listed firms are more likely to 
pay dividends to their shareholders than non-cross-listed firms; Chinese cross-listed firms pay 
more dividends to their shareholders than non-cross-listed companies; Chinese firms that are cross-
listed overseas pay more dividends to overseas investors than domestic investors. After the 
issuance of the Corporate Governance Code, Chinese firms pay more dividends to home-country 




The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature; 
Section 3 develops the underlying hypotheses and describes the sample and variables; Section 4 
provides details for the methodology; Section 5 reports the empirical results; and finally, Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Early studies on cross-listings  
 
The trend in which firms list their shares in foreign equity markets began in the 1970s, when a 
large number of companies from developed economies listed their equity stocks overseas with the 
intention of increasing their shareholder base, diversifying their portfolios and earning higher 
returns and, most importantly, to reduce the cost of raising capital (Foerster and Karolyi, 1993).  
From 1980 to 1990, the number of cross-border listings continued increasing, and at that time 
many firms from emerging economies started opening their stock markets to foreign investors.  
 
Earlier studies have identified several different motivations for cross-listing and have described 
how cross-listing is related to the cost of capital and information problems and how cross-listing 
influences firm value and corporate governance. The most prominent theory regarding the 
motivation for cross-listing is the market segmentation hypothesis: Companies list overseas to 
reduce the influence of market segmentation that increases firms’ cost of capital (Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2001, 2008; Fanto and Karmel, 1997; Mittoo, 1992). Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) 
said that firms are facing restrictions on certain individuals investing in certain securities and 
typically, investors are restricted by segmentation in international capital markets. Moreover, one 
possible solution for firms to overcome this restriction is the dual listing or multiple listing of their 
equity stocks on foreign capital exchanges. Alexander et al. (1988) stated that listing stocks on 
foreign exchanges is an important countermeasure for companies to overcome the difficulties due 
to market segmentation. Karolyi (1998) reviewed approximately 70 studies concerning the 
economic implications of companies’ overseas listing decision. The author summarized that cross-
listing reduces the risks of international investment and gives firms a chance to go global, and 




However, the number of cross-listed firms significantly declined in 2000. Karolyi (2006) described 
this downward trend in cross-listing and trading activities among countries: until the end of 2002, 
international cross-listing had reduced more than 50% compared to its highest point, whereby 
4,700 companies were involved in cross-listing in 1997. Scholars (e.g., Karolyi, 2006; and Stulz, 
1999) who were aware of this slowdown started to explain whether this decline is an anomaly due 
to market cycles or a structural break in the way in which firms globalize. So, they started to look 
for innovative ideas different from the conventional logic to explain this more sophisticated 
situation of cross-border listing.  
 
New studies began to look at the relevance of cross-listing with conflicts between controlling 
shareholders and public shareholders, information asymmetries and several other corporate 
governance problems. Stulz (1999) argued that the reduction of cost of capital might come from 
the reduction of conflicts between management and investors due to informational-asymmetries 
and potential agency problems. He emphasized that managers might have more information about 
their firms’ investment opportunities than shareholders, and further, they may have incentives to 
maximize their wealth instead of maximizing shareholders’ wealth. The corporate governance 
system, including both the internal controls and external regulation environment, is a critical 
element that determines the cost of capital.  When firms in less-developed capital markets raise 
capital in developed markets such as the U.S., they also learn from the more mature corporate 
governance systems and expose themselves to more effective monitoring. Thus, instead of saying 
that the barriers among countries may influence firms’ cost of capital, Stulz (1999) argued that the 
more developed capital markets provide more active and effective minority investors as well as 
more stringent regulations, which is the reason of the reduction in firms’ cost of capital. Gomes 
(2000) found that in countries where the legal system could not provide effective protection to 
minority shareholders, an agency problem is common among public firms. (Unlike the well-known 
definition, agency in this paper also includes the conflicts of interest between controlling 






2.2 Bonding theory 
 
After the 2008 financial crisis, researchers have revised prevalent theories based on market 
segmentation and reconsidered the existing explanations of the evidence that supported firms’ 
choice of cross-listing. Facing all these challenges, Stulz (1999) first developed a theory that 
indicates that management has the incentives to maximize its own value rather than shareholders’ 
value. Thus, firms domiciled in countries with weak protection of shareholder’s rights are willing 
to be exposed to a regulated environment with higher disclosure standards to transfer more control 
to minority shareholders and lead to a lower cost of capital. Coffee (1999) also supports the 
bonding theory in his studies. He mentioned that international listing is a process of self-selection. 
Firms pursuing growth to a global scale choose to abide by higher legal standards and well-
developed governance systems that have been developing for decades in the U.S., and such 
bonding would disperse controlling rights from large shareholders to public shareholders. Coffee 
(1999) indicated that U.S. securities regulations should allow foreign firms that seek to improve 
their governance to enter U.S. equity markets. He also mentioned in his subsequent study (Coffee, 
2002) that the prevailing practice of cross-border listing is to list and trade in countries where 
minority shareholders are well protected. According to La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. 
(2008), a more stringent legal system would prevent controlling shareholders from the 
expropriation of minority investors and provide minority investors with the ability to exercise their 
rights.  
 
A host of studies have provided evidence supporting the bonding theory. Reese and Weisbach 
(2002) find that cross-listing makes it easier to raise capital, and firms from countries where 
minority shareholders’ rights are poorly protected raise more equity in firms’ home country than 
in the US. Doidge (2004) also supported the bonding hypothesis, by the evidence that foreign firms 
that cross list in U.S. have lower voting premiums than foreign firms that do not cross list. They 
further controlled firm-level and country-level characteristics, and the results show even larger 
differences in the premium. Additionally, only firms that subsequently cross listed had lower 
voting premiums in the years before the cross-listing. In the subsequent study by Doidge et al. 
(2009), this cross-listing premium also appeared to be reliable and consistent each year from 1990 
to 2005. Ayyagari and Doidge (2010) found that before cross-listing, approximately 75% of the 
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surveyed firms had a controlling shareholder, but after, controlling shareholders’ voting rights 
decreased to approximately 50%, with an average decrease of 24% compared to non-cross-listed 
firms. Furthermore, control changes happened in 22% of the sample firms. Therefore, they argue 
that issuers voluntarily adopt a cross-listing in the U.S. to assist with changes in ownership and 
control. By examining the takeovers of U.S. firms by cross-listed firms, Burns et al. (2007) found 
that an important benefit of cross-listing is better legal protection and a regulatory environment, 
as these firms increase their information disclosure and corporate governance. 
 
2.3 Chinese stock market and cross-listing 
 
The Chinese economy has been playing an important role in the global market since it opened its 
market to the world. According to a 2008 report of the CSRC, in 2008, more than 800 Chinese 
securities were listed and traded overseas, and the total funds raised have amounted to over 112 
billion USD. The Chinese government employs a split-share system for the stock markets, where 
A-shares are traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, available to domestic investors 
and denominated in RMB currency and B-shares are traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges, only available to overseas investors and denominated in foreign currency. H-shares 
refer to shares from mainland Chinese companies that are registered and traded in the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and denominated in Hong Kong dollars. A central planned economy was 
dominant in the country since the establishment of China; yet after Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
reform in 1979 (open-the-door policy), the country began to open to foreign investment and to 
allow entrepreneurships and privatization; the economy gradually became more market oriented 
as a result. In the early 1990s, the two Chinese stock exchanges, Shanghai and Shenzhen, were 
established. Since then, the two exchanges have been controlled by the Chinese government. A 
quota on equity public offerings was approved and used by Chinese government to limit the 
quantity of shares being issued each year in these two exchanges, and most of the quota was 
allocated to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and large companies. Due to this restriction, many 
large companies seeking growth failed to get listed, and many small- and medium-sized companies 
in need of more funds were prevented from entering the exchange market. Therefore, they must 
explore other channels to raise funds for firm expansion. This is one of the situations driving many 
Chinese enterprises to go abroad. Chinese companies have been allowed to be traded in foreign 
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markets since 19931, for example, in the U.S., U.K. Singapore and Hong Kong, and eventually, H-
shares have become the highest in terms of number and public offering size.  
 
A theory explaining the cross-listing of Chinese firms is the “modern enterprise” or “governance” 
hypothesis suggested by Sun et al. (2012), which is similar to the bonding theory. The Chinese 
economy is transferring to a market economy, while the regulation system and market 
infrastructure have not been developed well. The cross-listing (of SOEs) in a well-functioning 
market could be an opportunity for Chinese firms to learn from foreign companies, and the Chinese 
government can also establish “a modern enterprise system” at home. They also found evidence 
of the benefit from cross-listing in better-functioning markets: there is valuation premium in stock 
prices in companies that sell both A- and H-shares over companies with only A-shares. The author 
attributed this premium to a higher-level corporate governance in Hong Kong. However, this 
theory should be distinguished from the bonding theory, as the “bonding” is enforced by the 
government, but is not the choice of firms themselves.  
 
On the other hand, market segmentation does not seem to be a correct reason for Chinese cross-
listings. Sun and Tong (2000) and Wang and Jiang (2004) found evidence opposed to the 
traditional market segmentation theory. They observed discounts and a lower PE ratio in H-shares 
compared to their counterparts in A-shares. Therefore, if these enterprises are listing on the Hong 
Kong stock exchange to lower their cost of capital, choosing to list in Hong Kong is not a wise 
decision. 
 
2.4 Dividend policy 
 
Earlier researchers (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; Allen and Michaely, 2003) 
believed that companies pay dividends to communicate with investors and markets as well as to 
signal positive information to the public. High and stable cash dividends are positive signals that 
a company is gaining profit in the current year and will keep generating profit in the future, while 
low dividends or no dividends at all are negative signals that the firm is doing badly this year and 
                                                 




the prospects are not promising, either. Information on firms’ performance is supposed to be 
passed to the public via dividend payments regardless of the decision makers’ intention to signal 
good performance. Direct evidence of the signaling effect is when firms pay substantially high 
dividends, their stock prices go up (Allen and Michaely, 2003). An early study on why firms pay 
dividends was conducted by Bhattacharya (1979), in which the author defined and provided an 
explanation for signaling. Denis and Osobov (2007) studied the dividend payment propensity for 
companies in the U.S., Canada, U.K., Germany, France and Japan. They found that dividend 
payers are mostly larger and profitable firms, which is inconsistent with signaling, as the theory 
suggests firms that attempt to signal their good performance should be smaller and less profitable.  
 
The re-distribution of excess cash is another view of dividend payouts. One hypothesis suggested 
by Berlingeri (2006) argues that the primary intention of firms paying dividends is to reallocate 
their free cash flow according to the current business cycle and according to future investment 
opportunities. In the early years of a company, the revenue generated internally cannot cover the 
cost of investment, so dividend payments are lower. Later, as the firm gains more capital, it 
becomes more willing to pay out excess free cash flow (Denis and Osobov, 2007). Grossman and 
Hart (1980), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) explained this issue from an alternative 
perspective. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), there are sustained conflicts between 
managers and shareholders, so when management controls significant disposable funds, the chance 
of overinvesting or investing in unprofitable projects will increase. Grossman and Hart (1980), 
Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) believe that the distribution of cash dividends is a solution 
to cut the amount of free cash held by management to reduce bad investments. However, Allen et 
al. (2000) and Allen and Michaely (2003) added in their research that it is management who 
determines the payout policy, so the policy must be in line with their interest or at least not be to 
their disadvantage. Therefore, external control and monitoring are necessary to assure payout 
decisions are primarily in line with shareholders’ interests.  
 
Some firm characteristics are widely known to have an influence on a company’s propensity to 
pay dividends. Fama and French (2000) discovered that with an increase in the number of small 
firms with low profitability and more growth opportunities, the percentage of U.S. companies 
paying dividends has decreased. They believe that changing characteristics is the key influential 
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factor of dividend recession and found that the likelihood of payment depends on three firm-level 
characteristics: profitability, investment opportunities and firm size. The likelihood of dividend 
payout tends to be higher in profitable and larger firms and lower in firms with more investment 
opportunities. Ferris et al. (2006) studied the dividend payout propensity for public firms in the 
U.K. and assessed whether the reduction in payout in the U.S. was becoming global. Consistent 
with Fama and French (2000), they concluded that firms with a larger size and higher profitability 
are more likely to pay dividends, whereas firms with more investment opportunities are less likely 
to pay. Benito and Young (2001) also recorded this trend in dividend paying companies in the U.K. 
They examined the omissions and cutting of dividends with more firm-level characters. The study 
indicated that companies with a larger size, more cash flow and a higher level of actual investment 
have a lower propensity to omit dividends, while companies with higher leverage and more 
investment opportunities tend to omit dividends. Their examination on dividend cuts had the same 
results as the dividend omissions. Von Eije and Megginson (2006) studied 3400 public companies 
in the European Union and found that the dividend amount and payout frequency are positively 
related to the firm size and age, while the amount and frequency are negatively related to firms’ 
growth rate and leverage. Denis and Osobov (2007) also found that dividend payers are mostly 




Our opinion on cross-listing is basically in support of the bonding hypothesis, and we expect to 
see an increase in the propensity of dividend payouts in cross-listed companies because of 
improved corporate governance. According to these previous studies on cross-listing and the 
bonding theory, we believe that the rigorous monitoring and regulation in the overseas stock 
markets and correspondingly improved corporate governance are factors driving management to 
pay more dividends. Grossman and Hart (1980), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) concluded 
that companies pay cash dividends to cut the amount of cash controlled by managers to reduce the 
likelihood of making bad investment decisions. So, we see the tendency to pay cash dividend as a 
direct proxy of the corporation governance level. Moreover, Allen et al. (2000) and Allen and 
Michaely (2003) argued that external regulation and monitoring is a necessary way to guarantee 
that managers make payout decisions wisely. We believe that Chinese issuers who list their stock 
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equity on foreign exchanges that have better-developed regulation systems and stronger discipline 
towards management and/or controlling shareholders will be more willing to give out cash 
dividends and/or offer a higher dividend payout ratio. Thus, we develop hypotheses 1 and 2 as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese cross-listed firms are more likely to pay dividends to their shareholders 
than non-cross-listed firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Chinese cross-listed firms pay more dividends to their shareholders than non-cross-
listed firms.  
 
We expect that by cross-listing, firms bonding themselves to developed capital markets not only 
increase their dividend payments overseas, but also to home country shareholders. One of the 
arguments of Sun et al. (2012) is that many SOEs choose to go outside with the aim of introducing 
the corporate governance structure and legal system to develop the Chinese market. If these 
companies successfully bond themselves to higher regulation standards, there should be substantial 
progress in corporate governance. Hence, we postulate that governance and regulations have 
improved in China because of cross-listing, which is also a kind of bonding, whether it is the 
initiative for companies or a strategic policy of the government. 
 
Although both overseas listings and corporate governance reform contribute to a better regulated 
and functioned capital market, still, we agree that corporate governance in China falls behind 
foreign markets, such as Singapore and the U.S. Berkman et al., (2010) examined Chinese trials 
of introducing new rules and regulations in 2002 and found these changes only partly effective, 
seeing that they virtually improved the protection of minority shareholders, whereas they cannot 
literally prohibit the expropriation of these shareholders in companies that have a strong link to 
the government. China has not established a market system that could be compared to a well-
developed modern market. Therefore, we assume that Chinese firms pay less cash dividends to 
home country investors than to foreign shareholders. Before the issuance of the Corporate 
Governance Code in 2002, there were no differences in domestic payments between cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed companies. Now that reform has facilitated the improvement of corporate 
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governance, cross-listed firms should pay more attention to domestic shareholders and increase 
dividend payments. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Chinese firms that are cross-listed overseas pay more dividends to overseas 
investors than domestic investors. 
 
Hypothesis 4: After the issuance of “Corporate Governance Code” in 2002, cross-listed 
companies increase dividend payout to their domestic shareholders.  
 
Overall, we suppose that firms trading their stock equities on developed countries’ exchanges pay 
more cash dividends because of the better protection for minority shareholders by bonding 
themselves to mature stock markets. In addition, we hypothesize that dividend payers tend to be 
more profitable and nonpayers tend to have more investment opportunities. We also believe that 
to reduce management’s poor decisions, firms with more free cash should have a higher propensity 
to pay dividend, so the amount of free cash flow should be negatively related to dividend payments. 
The establishment and operation of Chinese stock markets are more politically oriented, and 
Berkman et al., (2010) discovered that the 2002 Corporate Governance Code virtually improved 
the protection of minority shareholders, but the protection is not effective in companies that have 
a strong link to the government; thus, we need to control for level of state own in the following 
process, and we suppose that firms with a higher level of state control should have a  lower 
propensity of paying dividends. Because we also expect that better corporate governance will lead 
to better protection for minority stockholders, a larger board size will be related to a higher 
propensity to pay cash dividends. Berlingeri (2006) found that the possibility for companies to pay 
dividends decreases as companies grow older; hence, we hypothesize that a firm’s age is negatively 
related to its propensity to pay dividends. The amount of competition in industries is also 
considered to affect dividend payouts, as tough competition may result in a situation in which 
companies pay more dividends to signal investors or customers that that are trustworthy and 
promising. Moreover, we suppose that firms with more liabilities will have a lower propensity to 




4. Data  
4.1 Sample selection 
 
The full sample is supplied by Thomson Reuters Datastream, including all Chinese firms trading 
during the period of 1993–2014. Then, we removed all the B-share-only firms to obtain a sample 
consisting of 2,157 non-cross-listed firms. Here, we will introduce the Chinese split-share system 
to explain how we select sample firms. This paper focuses on three classes of shares on the Chinese 
stock market: A-shares, B-shares and H-shares. In addition, if a company issues both A- and B-
shares, we consider B-shares foreign shares; Companies that only issue B-shares in mainland 
China will not be described as cross listed and are excluded from the sample. Since the objective 
of this thesis is to shed more light on the dividend payment policy for cross-listed companies, the 
study focuses on foreign IPOs, and the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are excluded from 
the sample. 
 
Cross-listed firms are selected based on information provided by the China Stock Market & 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). From its China Overseas Listed Company Research 
Database, we obtained all Chinese firms listing in multiple stock exchanges (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, London and New York stock exchangess), and we removed those that list only overseas. 
Then, according to the previous selection criteria, B-shares and H-shares are only available to 
foreign investors and are denominated in foreign currency. We determined that if a cross-listed 
company issues both A- and B-shares, we consider the B-shares foreign shares. Companies that 
only issue B-shares or H-shares are considered overseas listed and are excluded from the sample. 
Finally, we obtained 73 cross-listed companies. Regarding non-cross-listed firms, all variables 
including dividends paid to domestic investors are available in Datastream. For cross-listed firms, 
most of the variables are available in the CSMAR; we also collected some missing dividends from 
firms’ annual reports to complete the dataset. After removing observations that has missing data, 
we had a total of 25,750 firm-year observations.  
 
Our dataset consists of Chinese public firms that only list in mainland China or multiple-list in 
mainland China and overseas, which is the whole sample and will be used in multivariate 
regressions. We also built a control group and a treatment group in the one-to-one matching 
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propensity score matching process and built a subsample consisting of matched firms. All firms in 
the control group are A-shares listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange, while all firms 
in the treatment group issue their shares on at least one mainland stock exchange and at least one 
foreign exchange.  
 
4.2 Dependent variables 
 
We measure the propensity of dividend payouts by the dividend yield, cash dividend per share and 
likelihood of dividend payments. The process of companies’ dividend payments is generally as 
follows: managers submit a dividend payment proposal to the board of directors in the first year 
and the final decision will be made and news will be released in the second or third season of the 
next year; the dividend (if there will be) will be distributed to shareholders very soon after the 
news is released. The ex-dividend day, dividend per share and common shares outstanding on the 
ex-dividend day are fiscal-year data, all of which are in the next year. The appendix provides the 
definitions and calculation for all variables that we used in this paper. 
 
The first important dependent variable is the annual dividend yields, which is calculated as the 
cash dividends per share divided by the closing price of each stock on the ex-dividend day. The 
dividend per share, closing price and ex-dividend date of stocks listing in mainland exchanges are 
collected from the CSMAR, while the dividend per share, closing price and ex-dividend date for 
overseas stocks are collected from Datastream on daily basis. In the regression models, the 
dependent variable Dividend Yield 1 denotes the payout ratio that firms (cross-listed or not) offer 
to their domestic shareholders, and the dependent variable Dividend Yield 2 denotes the weighted 
average payout ratio to all shareholders including foreign public investors, with a weight calculated 
by the daily closing price multiplied by the share outstanding on the ex-dividend day on each stock 
exchange (Hong Kong stock exchange, Singapore stock exchange and NYSE or NASDAQ as well 
as Shanghai A or Shenzhen A). For non-cross-listed firms, Dividend Yield 2 equals the value of 
Dividend Yield 1. 
 
The second dependent variable is the annual dividends per share, which indicates the total amount 
of cash dividends (in Chinese Yuan) divided by the total number of common shares outstanding, 
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which can also be found in the CSMAR or Datastream. The dependent variable Dividend Per 
Share 1 represents the cash dividend per share that firms (cross-listed or not) pay to domestic 
common-share holders, while the dependent variable Dividend Per Share 2 represents the 
weighted average amount of cash payments provided to all shareholders including foreign 
shareholders. The weights are calculated using the daily closing price multiplied by the share 
outstanding on the ex-dividend date on each stock exchange (Hong Kong stock exchange, 
Singapore stock exchange and NYSE as well as Shanghai A or Shenzhen A).  
 
The last dependent variable is the Dividend Payment Dummy implying whether a firm chooses to 
pay dividends or not during the year. The Dividend Payment Dummy equals 1 when a company 
pays cash dividends during the fiscal year and equals 0 otherwise. An interesting discovery we 
made is that the likelihood of dividend payments to domestic stockholders and overseas 
stockholders is consistent, that is if a company pays cash dividends for a certain year to domestic 
shareholders, it must pay its foreign shareholders as well. There is no one company that pay 
dividend only to home-country investors or to foreign investors in any observation year. For this 
variable, therefore, we did not distinguish between the domestic Dividend Payment Dummy and 
Dividend Payment Dummy. 
 
4.3 Independent variables and control variables 
 
The variable Dummy Crosslist is the main variable of interest in our study, which equals 1 if a firm 
is cross listed during the observation year and 0 otherwise. This study also includes several control 
variables to absorb the potential impacts on dividends. There are some firm-level characteristics 
that we believe have an influence on dividend policies. Companies that have fewer growth 
opportunities are more willing to pay dividends (Fama and French, 2001). Following the study of 
Denis and Osobov (2007), who measured growth opportunities as the percentage change in total 
assets over the year, we control for Invest using the total asset growth rate. The Free Cash Flow is 
adopted as the control variable, as we believed that firms with more disposable cash would tend to 
pay more cash dividends to prevent management from disposing of them unwisely, and we 
calculated it as the percentage of net cash flow from operating activities compared to total assets. 
We also consider Sales Growth a factor that influences dividend policies. Berlingeri (2006) found 
 17 
 
that the possibility for companies to pay dividends decreases along with as companies grow older. 
Therefore, we control Firm Age from a firm’s year of incorporation to every observation year. HHI 
Industry is also considered to have an influence on dividends, as if the competition is tough in 
certain industries, the companies will be more willing to pay more dividends to signal investors or 
consumers that they are performing well. Since we also believe that the dividend policy of Chinese 
companies significantly depends on corporate governance, the variable Board Size is included as 
a proxy of governance.  
 
Four variables are used during the PSM process, in which we are looking for factors that influence 
the choice of cross-listing and dividends. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) suggested a way to 
implement PSM, saying that there are two basic decisions in the approach: the model choice and 
the variables choice. They found out that it makes no difference in results whether a logit 
regression model or a probit regression model is practiced, but the choice of variables is critical. 
An identification rule, the conditional independence assumption (CIA), requires control variables 
to affect the treatment decision and the outcome variables simultaneously. The decision is the 
cross-listing, and the outcome variables are the dividend yield, dividends per share and Dividend 
Payment Dummy. According to Fama and French (2001), U.S. firms that are larger, more profitable 
and have fewer growth opportunities are likely to pay dividends. Fama and French (2001) and 
Denis and Osobov (2007) both adopted the market-to-book ratio to measure growth opportunities. 
In respect to profitability, Fama and French (2001) used ROA as measurement. Previous studies 
often adopted the absolute value of assets, or log asset, as a measurement of firm size; however, 
Firm Size   has a high correlation with State Own, the portion of shares held by government to the 
total amount, because SOEs tend to be larger firms. We replace Firm Size with State Own in 
consideration of the Chinese situation in which the level of government control is one of the most 
critical influences on the governance decision of local companies. Moreover, before the Chinese 
government called off the quota on the IPO, the Chinese stock market had not been well-developed 
and was still immature, and Chinese enterprises had too much debt in their account but lacked 
equities, so they sought more capitals (Mei et al., 2009). However, due to the restriction policy, 
firms must wait in a long line to enter domestic exchanges, which is why they list their shares 
across the border. Thus, we suppose that the leverage ratio is another firm characteristic related to 
the cross-listing decision. Hence, the vector of independent variables consists of leverage, ROA, 
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State Own and MB Ratio. We did not adopt Firm Age because the variable is related to dividend 
payment but not cross-listing (some companies are cross-listed at the beginning and some choose 
to cross-list when their size is larger and they need more funds to grow).  
 
5. Methodology 
5.1 The propensity score matching process and univariate comparison 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the changes in the propensity of dividend payouts due to the 
cross-listing decision. However, one company cannot be cross listed (marked as treated) and non-
cross-listed (marked as untreated) at the same time, which means we are not able to identify the 
counterpart of treated companies. This makes observation difficult; if we want to observe the 
dividend difference between these two groups of companies, ideally all firm-level characteristics 
and all other characteristics should be identical. As a solution to this, we obtain a group of 
companies as a comparison to the treated companies so that each unit in the treated group can be 
compared with a similar one. Nevertheless, comparing treated firms with a comparison group of 
untreated firms will result in possible sample selection bias. As noted in the paper of Sun et al. 
(2012), beginning in 1993, many Chinese SOEs had their stock equity listed overseas due to share 
issue privatization, and Mei et al. (2009) mentioned that Chinese companies cross-listing overseas 
could be motivated by the need for more equity to increasing their leverage ratio. Hence, it is likely 
that a cross-listed sample is bias towards large, profitable and low-leverage firms. Further, a 
difference in dividends between two groups of companies may be correlated with factors that also 
determine whether a firm decided to cross list instead of due to the influence of the cross-listing 




= α𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑀𝐵 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
 
To perform a PSM approach, first we conducted a probit regression for each year to estimate the 
propensity score that will be used in matching later. The probit regression is used to determine the 
cross-listing probability rather than estimating parameters. In the regression model, the dependent 
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variable is Dummy Cross-listing, where 1 denotes treated and 0 denotes untreated, and the vector 
of control variables consists of Leverage, ROA, MB ratio and State Own. According to Mei et al. 
(2009), Chinese enterprises are reported to have too much debt in their capital structure, which 
could drive them to list cross borders, as they are indeed willing to issue equity outside China. 
Thus, we use leverage as a determinant of cross-listing. As suggested by Fama and French (2001) 
and Ferris et al. (2006), companies that are more profitable have a higher propensity to pay 
dividend, so we followed their measurement and adopted ROA as a proxy for profitability. We 
also adopted the market-to-book ratio to measure the growth opportunity, as suggested by Fama 
and French (2001) and Denis and Osobov (2007). Furthermore, Cooper (2002) stated that the 
formation and the development of Chinese stock markets follows a political rather than a market-
oriented approach. Therefore, we adopt State Own, the number of shares owned by the state to the 
total number of share outstanding (in percentage), in consideration of the situation in which the 
level of government control may affect governance decisions in Chinese companies. The approach 
is done on an annual basis. We consider firms that are cross listed one year before the observation 
year, firms cross listed in the observation year and firms that will be cross listed the next year as 
cross-listed firms. We run 16 probit regressions with Dummy Crosslist as the dependent variable 
and four independent variables to obtain the propensity scores for each year. According to the 
estimation results, we conducted a nearest (one-to-one) PSM, so each year we obtained several 
pairs of firms that matched with each other, so through the PSM period from 1994 to 2013, there 
are 33 matched pairs including 66 companies. Then, we added the observations of these matched 
pairs for each year, and in the end, the matched sample had 675 firm-year observations. The sample 
dropped from 73 cross-listed companies to 33 because many failed during PSM and there was a 
great deal of missing data.  
 
After PSM, we conducted a diagnostic test to check the quality of PSM to ensure that there was 
no significance difference in the vector of control variables among the treated and the untreated 
groups. We re-estimate a probit regression with the final matched sample (33 pairs of matched 
companies). We used the Dummy Crosslist as the dependent variable and the same vector of PSM 
variables as the independent variables. We expect the coefficient of PSM variables to show no 
statistical significance, which indicates that the matching algorithm has successfully removed the 
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possible influence on the cross-listing decision by the four firm characteristics, so that we can 
directly observe the changes in outcome due to the cross-listing decision. 
 
In addition, we did univariate comparisons to check whether the matching process removed the 
difference in the four control variables between the two groups. We reviewed the mean for 
untreated and treated groups as well as the differences in Leverage, ROA, State Own and MB Ratio 
between each group. We also examined their mean and difference in the dependent variables: 
Dividend Per Share 1, Dividend Yield 1, Dividends Per Share 2 and Dividend Yield 2. Here, we 
expected to see a significantly higher propensity of dividend payouts for the cross-listed group. 
Moreover, only adopting the treated sample, we compared the dividends per share and dividend 
yield for the same firm. The mean of the dividends for overseas shareholders and the mean of 
dividends for mainland investors as well as the difference between these means will be presented, 
and what we expected to see is that the same cross-listed company have a higher propensity to pay 
dividends to foreign stockholders than to mainland stockholders.   
 
5.2 Regression models 
 
In this study, we examine the impact of cross-listing on companies’ dividend policy using OLS 
regressions, which is tested separately in two samples, the original whole sample and the matched 
sample selected in the PSM process. We run first three regressions with 675 post-matching 
observations. In Model 1, we estimate whether cross-listing as well as certain control variables 
would affect the likelihood of dividend payment. In Model 2, we estimate how cross-listing 
influences the dividends per share; Model 3 indicates how cross-listing affects firms’ dividend 
yield ratio.  
Model 1: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
= α𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
Model 2: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 2
= α𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4





= α𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
 
In Model 1, the dependent variable is the Dividend Payment Dummy, which takes a value of 1 if a 
firm pays dividends in the observation year and 0 if no cash dividend is paid. In Model 2, Dividend 
Per Share 2 denotes the weighted average dividend per share for all shareholders of the listed 
market. In Model 3, the dependent variable Dividend Yield 2 is the weighted average dividend per 
share over the closing share price for all shareholders in the listed market. The variable Dummy 
Crosslist is the key dummy variable we are studying, and it equals 1 if a firm is cross listed in the 
observation year and 0 otherwise. We have already controlled for leverage, ROA, State Own and 
MB Ratio in the matching process, and the control variables included in Models 1, 2 and 3 are Free 
Cash Flow, Sales Growth, Firm Age, HHI Industry and Board Size.   
 
In regard to the whole sample, we estimate how cross-listing affects the likelihood of dividend 
payout in Model 4, where the Dividend Payment Dummy takes the value of 1 if cash dividends are 
paid and 0 if no cash dividend is paid. Model 5 estimates how cross-listing influences the dividends 
per share, whereby Dividend Per Share 2 indicates the weighted average dividend per share for all 
shareholders. Model 6 examines how cross-listing influences firms’ dividend yield ratio, and the 
dependent variable Dividend Yield 2 is the weighted average dividend per share over the closing 
share price for all shareholders. Again, the main independent variable is Dummy Crosslist. The 
control variables Invest, Free Cash Flow, Sales Growth, Firm Age, HHI Industry and Board Size 
are adopted in the regression model. We also controlled for Leverage, ROA, State Own and MB 
Ratio, as the whole sample did not go through the matching process. 
  
Model 4: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 
= α𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑀𝐵 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8





𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 2
= α𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑀𝐵 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11
∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
Model 6: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 2
= α𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑀𝐵 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8
∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
 
5.3 Robustness test 
 
Another problem we aim to avoid is endogeneity. We have mentioned that election bias exists in 
the treated sample, and except for that, we are still concerned about other unobservable 
characteristics that determines cross-listing and dividend at the same time. What we need is a 
quasi-natural experiment in which all companies undergo and observable exogeneous variation, 
and this variation should be an event that affects cross-listing. In 2002, CSRC issued the Corporate 
Governance Code, which is said to be very similar to an international standard. The code is 
implemented to regulate all the public firms in China in terms of governance. Sun et al. (2012) 
compared the performance of A-shares with the matched sample of H-shares through the period 
of code implementation, finding that although H-shares still maintain a premium over A-shares, 
the premium significantly decreased after 2002. Thus, they concluded that corporate governance 
among the listed firms in China has greatly been improved since 2002. We introduced an interact 
dummy variable: 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2002, which equals 1 for firm-year observation on or after the issuing of the 
Corporate Governance Code and 0 otherwise. 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 
                             = 𝛼 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2002 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2002 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑀𝐵 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 
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We estimated the model above. The multivariate model is estimated with cross-listed and non-
cross-listed companies that issued IPOs before 2002. For dependent variables, we use Dividend 
Yield 1 indicating the dividend payout ratio that a firm offers to domestic shareholders. The main 
variable in this regression is Crosslist Firm Dummy multiplied by 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2002. The dummy variable 
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2002 equals 1 if the observation year is after (or includes) 2002, 0 otherwise. The cross-listed 
firm dummy presents 1 if the firm goes cross-listed during its lifetime and 0 if it never lists share 
equities outside mainland China. Therefore, this interaction term equals 1 only when the 
observation is a cross-listed firm and the observation year is after (or includes) the year of the 
exogeneous event. We also include a vector of control variables that might have influence on firm’s 
choice of cross-listing (Leverage, ROA, State Own and MB Ratio). We hope the coefficient of the 
interaction term captures and reflects a casual effect of cross-listing. If the bonding theory is true, 
after 2002, there should be an obvious difference in the dividend yield compared to before, as 
corporate governance will be improved. The dividend payment amount should be improved 
correspondingly, and thus coefficients of Crosslist Firm Dummy* 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2002 are expected to be 
positive and statistically significant.  
 
6. Results 
6.1 Summary statistics and diagnostic test  
 
As stated, the completed sample consists of 2,230 Chinese public firms with 2,157 non-cross-listed 
firms and 73 cross-listed firms and includes 25,750 firm-year observations in total. Table 1 
presents the correlations among all the independent variables and control variables. Table 2 
illustrates the average of each variable included in this study based on the whole sample. It also 
provides detailed information on their mean values by groups (cross-listed and non-cross-listed), 
differences between the two groups and the level of significance. From table 2, we can get a general 
idea that Dividend Yield 1 and Dividend Yield 2 and Dividend Per Share 1 of corss-listed firms are 







Table 1: Correlation matrix 
This table provides the Pearson correlation coefficients for all control variables included in the analyses. Main dependent variables and dummy 
variables are not considered.  
 








Leverage    1.000           
ROA 0.070 1.000          
State Own -0.005 -0.007 1.000         
MB Ratio -0.013 -0.030 0.004 1.000        
Free Cash Flow -0.015 0.013 0.036 -0.017 1.000       
Sales Growth  >0 <0 -0.001 >0 -0.003 1.000      
Invest <0 <0 -0.003 >0 -0.009 0.058 1.000     
Firm Size -0.027 <0 0.015 0.007 0.082 0.008 0.016 1.000    
Firm Age 0.025 <0 0.148 0.008 -0.011 0.008 0.008 -0.098 1.000   
HHI Industry 0.007 0.037 0.030 -0.011 0.017 0.005 -0.003 0.009 0.017 1.000  
Board Size 0.017 -0.017 0.062 -0.0010 0.012 0.020 0.002 0.159 -0.025 0.030 1.000 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics (number of observation and mean) for the full sample, cross-listed subsample and non-cross-listed 
subsample. The “Difference test” column reports the differences of means between cross-listed group and non-cross-listed group are also reported. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Variables  Whole sample  Cross-listed (1)  Non-cross-listed (0)  Difference Test 
(1) -(0)   Obs Mean  Obs Mean  Obs Mean  
Leverage  23,123 0.606  304 0.578  22,819 0.606   -0.029 
ROA  23,120 0.995  304 0.041  22,816 1.007   -0.966 
State Own  22,820 0.243  304 0.337  22,516 0.242   0.096*** 
MB Ratio  22,817 0.003  304 0.002  22,513 0.003   -0.001 
Invest  20,986 0.872  288 0.160  20,698 0.882   -0.721 
Free Cash Flow  21,046 0.044  271 0.052  20,775 0.044   0.008 
Sales Growth  18,649 2.400  215 0.212  18,434 2.422   -2.210 
Firm Age  23,127 16.600  304 17.651  22,823 16.586   1.065*** 
HHI Industry  23,004 0.128  264 0.139  22,740 0.127   -0.014 
Board Size  20,228 9.775  259 12.293  19,969 9.743   2.551*** 
Dividend Per Share 1  23,031 0.083  288 0.107  22,740 0.138   -0.031 
Dividend Yield 1 23,031 0.008  288 0.013  22,740 0.009   0.004*** 
Dividend per share2 23,127 0.084  304 0.170  22,823 0.083   0.087*** 
Dividend yield2 23,127 0.008  304 0.014  22,823 0.008   0.007*** 
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Table 3 reports the results for post-match probit regression, and none of the four coefficients are 
statistically significant, which indicates no significant difference in the control variables among 
cross-listed and non-cross-listed companies. Therefore, PSM has removed the impact of leverage, 
ROA, State Own and MB Ratio on the decision of cross-listing. The results of the univariate 
comparison are shown in Table 4. Panel A includes the t-test results based on the post-match 
sample. We did not detect any statistically significant difference in the control variables between 
the control and treatment groups; thus, the differences between the four variables were reduced by 
PSM. The univariate comparison for dividends per share indicated no significant difference, which 
is incongruent with our expectation. However, for Dividend Yield 1 and Dividend Yield 2, we found 
positive and significant differences, which is consistent with our deduction that cross-listed 
companies pay a higher dividend ratio than their counterparts. Because the dividend yield is the 
ratio of the dividends per share over the closing price, it should represent the dividend payment 
more accurately than the dividends per share. Panel B reports the univariate test for all cross-listed 
companies, showing the number, mean and difference in the dividends per share and dividend 
yield that companies allocate to domestic and foreign stockholders. There are significant positive 
differences in both the dividends per share and dividend yield, indicating that in the same group 
of cross-listed companies, foreign investors generally receive more dividend rewards than 
domestic investors. 
 
In sum, both probit regression and univariate tests provide evidence that the matched group 
eliminated the noticeable dissimilarity in key firm characteristics: the dividend yield for cross-
listed firms is significantly higher than their counterparts. In addition, there is no statistically 
significant difference in the dividends per share. In cross-listed companies, foreign investors 
generally gain higher dividend rewards than domestic investors, supporting our hypothesis that 









Table 3: Diagnostic regression 
This table reports parameter estimates from the probit model used in estimating the propensity scores for 
the cross-listed and non-cross-listed sample. We match non-cross-listed firms to cross-listed by a one-to-
one approach, without replacement, using 4 firm characteristics: leverage, ROA, State Own and MB Ratio. 
The dependent variable in the probit model is the Dummy Crosslist. The “Post-Match” column contains the 
coefficients of the probit model estimated using the subsample of matched pairs of firms. Definitions of all 
variables are listed in the Appendix. T-statistics are displayed below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate 



















Pseudo R2 0.005 
P-value of x2 0.346 
 
Table 4: Univariate test 
Panel A of Table 5reports the difference in means test results for the 33 pairs of cross-listed and non-cross-
listed firms after matching. Panel B of Table 4 reports the balance test results for the dividend payment to 
overseas shareholders and mainland shareholders for the 73 cross-listed firms. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A 
 Cross-listed (1) Non-cross-listed (0)  
Variables Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Diff. (1) -(0) 
Leverage 330 0.590 345 0.705  -0.115 
ROA 330 0.040 345 0.103  -0.063 
State Own 330 0.312 345 0.284  <0 
MB Ratio 330 0.002 345 0.002  <0 
Dividend Per Share 1 330 0.107 345 0.138  -0.031 
Dividend Yield 1 330 0.013 345 0.009  0.004*** 
Dividend Per Share 2 330 0.173 345 0.139  0.035 
Dividend Yield 2 330 0.173 345 0.138  0.006*** 
Panel B 
 Overseas (1) Mainland (0)   
variables Obs. Mean Obs. Mean  Diff. (1) -(0) 
Dividend per share 330 0.221 330 0.107  0.114*** 





6.2 Multivariate regression 
 
In regard to multivariate regression, we first ran three regressions with the matched sample. The 
results are shown in Table 5. We ignored four control variables since they have been included in 
the PSM process and kept the other control variables: invest, Free Cash Flow, Sales Growth, Firm 
Age, HHI Industry and Board Size. Multivariable regression (1) provides the results for Model 1 
in which the dependent variable is the Dividend Payment Dummy. The estimation for e is positive 
0.148, but not significant. The results of Model 2 are shown in regression (2), and the coefficient 
for the dummy variable is 0.047, but not significant; therefore, cross-listing has no influence on 
the average dividend per share according to this equation. In regression (3) where Dividend Yield 
2 is the dependent variable, the estimation for Dummy Crosslist is 0.003 and is at a significance 
level of 95%, implying that cross-listed firms offer a slightly higher cash dividends yield. Hence, 
we conclude that cross-listed firms pay a higher yield than non-cross-listed firms, and the result 
remains consistent with the bonding theory, even after the matching procedure.  
 
Table 5: Multivariate regression with matched sample 
Table 6 reports the results for regressions of cross-listing’s influence on propensity of dividend payment. 
Regression (1) is a probit regression on the likelihood of dividend payment. Regression (2) is a regression 
on the dividend per share. Regression (3) is a regression on the dividend yield. The sample includes all 
matched pairs of cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dividend Payment 
Dummy  
Dividend Per Share 2 Dividend Yield 2 
Dummy Crosslist 0.148 0.047 0.003** 
Invest 2.249*** 0.108 0.005 
Free Cash Flow 5.888*** 2.208*** 0.029*** 
Sales Growth -0.203 -0.026 <0   
Firm Age -0.055 -0.019** <0 
HHI Industry -1.154 0.420 -0.013 
Board Size .0012 0.015** >0 
Constant  0.037 0.162 0.002 
Prob > chi2 0.000   
Pseudo R2          0.078   
R2  0.166 0.056 
Adjusted R2  0.155 0.046 




For the control variables, the coefficients of Free Cash Flow are positive and significant in all 
three regressions, implying that the free cash flow is positively related to the propensity of dividend 
payouts. This supports our previous hypothesis that companies with more free cash flow have a 
higher propensity to pay dividends due to the need to restrict the management of using such cash 
inappropriately. The coefficients of the variable Firm Age are negative, with a 95% level of 
significance in regression (2), which in line with the conclusion of Von Eije and Megginson (2006) 
that firms pay less dividends as their age increases. Moreover, the coefficients of Board Size are 
significant in regression (2); therefore, we conclude that companies with larger boards pay more 
dividends. A larger board size may ensure better corporate governance and more protection 
towards minority shareholders, which could explain why the board size is positively related to the 
dividend payment. However, the coefficients of invest are statistically significant but positive in 
regression (1), which is somewhat inconsistent with our prediction that investment will reduce the 
dividend payment. The positive relation may due to the fact that high-speed growing companies 
are competitive and better-performing so they have a higher propensity to pay dividends. 
 
The other three regressions are based on the whole sample, and all 73 cross-listed companies are 
included. The results are presented in Table 6 and are consistent with our prediction that with all 
other related variables controlled, the coefficients of Dummy Crosslist are positive and statistically 
significant. In regression (1), the coefficient of the dummy variable equals 0.709 with a 
significance level of 99%, so the cross-listed firms are 70% more likely to pay cash dividends than 
the non-cross-listed firms. In the second regression, the estimation for Dummy Crosslist equals 
0.122 with a significance level of 99%, meaning that overall, the cross-listed firms pay more cash 
dividends per share to shareholders than the non-cross-listed firms. In equation (3), the coefficient 
of the dummy variable is 0.005 with a 99% significance level, indicating that the dividend payout 
ratio is higher for cross-listed firms than non-cross-listed firms. In all, the coefficients of the 
dummy variables in regressions (1) (2) and (3) are significant. The results points to the conclusion 
that companies that cross list on overseas stock exchanges have a higher propensity of paying 
dividends. The explanation could be that Chinese companies that (on purpose or not) bond 
themselves to better-developed capital markets (the U. S., Hong Kong, Singapore, the U.K. and so 
on) will experience development in corporate governance and in majority shareholder protection; 
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the proof is the growing likelihood of dividend payments, the growing dividends per share and the 
increasing dividend payout ratio.  
 
Table 6: Multivariate regression with whole sample 
Table 7 reports the results for regressions of cross-listing’s influence on propensity of dividend payment. 
Regression (1) is a probit regression on the likelihood of dividend payment. Regression (2) is a regression 
on the dividend per share. Regression (3) is a regression on the dividend yield. We use the full sample 
which includes 73 cross-listed companies and 2157 non-cross-listed companies. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Dividend Payment 
Dummy 
Dividend Per Share 2 Dividend Yield 2 
Dummy Crosslist 0.709*** 0.122*** 0.005*** 
Leverage -2.037*** <0 <0 
ROA 0.012*** <0 <0 
State Own 0.386*** 0.031*** 0.005*** 
MB Ratio -0.089 0.011 <0 
Invest <0 >0 <0 
Free Cash Flow 3.582*** 0.070*** 0.004*** 
Sales Growth >0 <0 <0 
Firm Age -0.117*** -0.007*** <0*** 
Hhi Industry -0.751*** -0.033*** -0.004*** 
Board Size 0.068*** 0.004*** >0*** 
Constant 2.260*** 0.141*** 0.011*** 
Prob > chi2 0.000   
Pseudo R2          0.119   
R2  0.069 0.059 
Adjusted R2  0.068 0.059 
Observations 18528 18528 18528 
 
The coefficient of State Own is positive and statistically significant in all the regressions, which 
means that the propensity of dividend payments is largely dependent on the level of state control, 
and the degree of government control is positively related to both the likelihood and amount of the 
dividend payments. This is inconsistent with the deduction that minority shareholders get less 
protection in companies that has a strong link to the government. Even though companies with 
high level of government control do not protect their shareholders well, these companies are larger 
in size, more profitable, so they have a higher propensity to pay dividends. In regression (1), the 
coefficient of leverage is negative and significant and the coefficient of ROA is positive and 
significant, indicating that firm leverage is negatively related to dividends, but ROA is positively 
related to the probability of paying dividends. These results confirm our deduction that profitable 
 30 
 
companies and companies with more state control pay more dividends, while companies with more 
liabilities than equity pay less dividends. Furthermore, the coefficients of both Free Cash Flow 
and Board Size are estimated to be statistically significant positive in three models, which is in line 
with the hypothesis that the amount of free cash flow and larger boards will have positive 
influences on the propensity to pay cash dividends. Moreover, estimations for both Firm Age and 
HHI Industry are negative and significant, consistent with our hypothesis that companies have a 
lower propensity to pay dividends as they grow older, and when competition in the industry is 
higher, they have a lower propensity to pay.  
 
6.3 Robustness checks 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the robustness test in the multivariate regression framework. Our aim 
is to examine whether the issuance of the Corporate Governance Code has an influence on the 
dividend payout ratio and whether the development of corporate governance will increase the 
dividend payment. The estimation of crosslist firm dummy* 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2002 equals 0.007 and is highly 
significant at the 99% level, which shows that cross-listed companies increased their dividend 
payout ratio to domestic shareholders after 2002. The coefficient of 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2002 is also positive and 
significant at 95%, implying that after the code was issued, Chinese companies increased their 
dividend payout ratio to their domestic shareholders. As mentioned, in 2002 the CSRC issued the 
Corporate Governance Code and was supposed to improve corporate governance among all 
companies. Sun et al. (2012) also found that corporate governance among listed firms in China has 
greatly improved after 2002. The explanation is that a Chinese governance revolution improved 
corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders, so companies have a higher 
propensity of paying cash dividends. For that reason, we conclude that improvements in corporate 
governance increase the dividend payout ratio in Chinese cross-listed companies to investors of 








Table 7: Multivariate regression on domestic dividend payment 
Table 8 reports the results from the Multivariate regression. The multivariate model is estimated with cross-
listed and non-cross-listed companies that issued IPO before 2002, the year when corporate governance 
Code was issued. Dividend Yield 1 (dividend paid to domestic shareholders) is the dependent variable. 
Crosslist Firm Dummy* Post2002  is the interaction term. The control variable Crosslist Firm Dummy 
equals to 1 if a company go cross-listed during its lifetime. Post 2002 equals to 1 if the observation year is 
after 2002 (including year 2002). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Independent Variables  
Crosslist Firm Dummy* Post2002 0.007*** 




State Own 0.005*** 
MB Ratio 0.001 
Constant 0.001 
Industry FE YES 
Year FE YES 
 R2 0.112 




We lost a great amount of firm-year observations during propensity score matching process; the 
number of cross-listed companies shrinks from 73 to 33 and ends up with 675 firm-year 
observations including cross-listed and non-cross-listed companies. Because some of the 
companies still have missing data on the four control variables and some of them failed the 
matching process, and we only have 73 cross-listed companies compared to the 2,157 non-cross-
listed companies, so the treatment group is small at the beginning. One possible solution to this is 
a traditional two-step matching suggested by Ritter (1991). Ritter (1991) matched U.S. firms with 
Chinese firms first by industry and then by the closest market value. Proelss, et al (2016) studied 
based on 1,312 publicly traded firms in China and 1,912 U.S. companies, six different matching 
algorithms are employed to match Chinese companies and U.S. companies, including this two-
step matching algorithm and nearest neighbour propensity score matching. However, the 
disadvantage of the traditional matching process is the lack of balancing among variables. As in 
the approach of Ritter (1991), the only criterion is a closest market value after the author classify 
industries. As a result, matched companies could be significantly different in other characters, such 
as leverage ratio, governance control, firm size, ROA and so on. Propensity score matching 
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balances treatment and control groups on many covariates, which are Leverage, ROA, MB Ratio 
and State Own in our research, and we considered the matched sample are matched better on four 
variables instead of 4. Another solution could be increasing the sample base. If we include ADRs 




The aim of our study of Chinese cross-listed and non-cross-listed companies is to prove the 
bonding theory by examining the casual effect of cross-listing on the propensity of dividend 
payments. The study is based on 2157 Chinese cross-listed companies and 73 non-cross-listed 
companies. Instead of using the traditional simple OLS estimation method for regression dividend 
payments on a cross-listed dummy variable, we constructed an untreated group to compare with 
the treated group. We conducted a one-to-one PSM based on two kinds of companies and the 
propensity scores so that significant variations in firm-level control variables were moved during 
the matching process. Then, we ran six multivariate regressions separately using the whole sample 
and a matched sample, and with the likelihood of dividend payment, dividends per share and 
dividend yield as the dependent variables. The results for the matched sample are consistent with 
the second hypothesis that Chinese cross-listed firms pay more dividends to their shareholders than 
non-cross-listed companies. The results for the whole sample are in correspondence with both the 
first and second hypotheses that Chinese firms that are cross-listed are more likely to pay dividends, 
and pay more dividends, than non-cross-listed companies. The univariate test results supported the 
first hypothesis and confirmed hypothesis 3 that Chinese cross-listed companies pay more 
dividends to overseas investors than domestic investors.  
 
For robustness tests, we used the exogeneous change initiated by the Chinese government as well 
as the Crosslist Firm Dummy to construct interaction variables. The interaction term is used to test 
the effect of the Corporate Governance Code on the propensity of dividend payouts to domestic 
stockholders. We expected that the corporate governance reform would have a positive influence 
on dividend payments by facilitating the protection of minority shareholders. Specifically, we ran 
a regression on dummy variables denoting the variation in 2002 due to the reform. The results are 
in line with hypothesis 4 that following the corporate governance reform, cross-listed Chinese 
 33 
 
firms increased their payout ratio to their domestic investors. In regard to the bonding theory, the 
study offers a new perspective on testing the theory, according to which firms are self-selected to 
list in a foreign market that has more stringent regulations and a better legal environment to 
improve corporate governance and the protection towards minority shareholders (Coffee, 1999). 
We hypothesized that the protection of minority shareholders is reflected in a firm’s propensity to 
pay cash dividends, as dividends directly reflect the shareholder’s value. Hence, we conducted 
tests and ran regressions on the propensity to pay dividends to determine whether cross-listing 
would have a casual and positive impact on dividend payouts, and if the results demonstrated a 
significantly positive influence, we interpret this as due to legal bonding. There are two limitations 
in the study. First, we used PSM to establish the treatment and control group, however, a traditional 
way might give us a larger matched sample, so later study could try more matching algorithms. 
Second, we specifically focused on dual- and multi-listing companies in China, yet in regard to 
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Table of Variable definitions 
This table provides information of definition and calculation for all variables that we adopted in this paper. 
 
Variable Name  Description and Calculation 
   
Dividend Per Share 1 = Dividends per share for Chinese mainland shareholders in Chinese 
local currency (CNY) during the observation year 
Dividend Per Share 2 = Weighted average dividends per share for shareholders of all listed 
markets shareholders in CNY during the observation year 
Dividend Yield 1 = Dividends per share over the closing share price for Chinese mainland 
public shareholders during the observation year 
Dividend Yield 2 = Weighted average of dividends per share over the closing share price 
for shareholders of all listed markets during the observation year 
Dividend Payment 
Dummy 
= Dividend payment dummy equals 1 if dividends are paid in the 
observation year, 0 otherwise 
Dummy Crosslist = Dummy Crosslist equals 1 when the firm is cross-listed overseas in 
the observation year, 0 otherwise 
Crosslist Firm Dummy = Crosslist firm dummy equals 1 if the firm has been cross-listed 
overseas during its lifetime, and equals if only listed in the home 
country 
Post2002 = Equals 1 when the observation year is 2002 or after 2002, and 0 when 
the year is before 2002 
Leverage = Total liabilities over total assets 
ROA = Net profit after taxes over total assets 
State Own = The percentage of shares owned by the State to the total number of 
outstanding shares  
MB Ratio = Ratio of firm's market value to its book value 
Free Cash Flow = Net cash flow from operating activities over the total assets 
Sales Growth = Cash received from the sales of goods or rendering of services 
Invest = Total asset growth rate 
Firm Size = Logarithmic of a firm's total market value 
Firm Age = Observation year minus the year of establishment  
HHI Industry = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for industry 
Board Size = Total number of board members  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
